REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF

KENNETH R. JACKSON

ON BEHALF OF

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 2009-261-E

1 Q. ARE YOU THE SAME KENNETH R. JACKSON THAT HAS PREFILED

DIRECT TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE?

3 A. Yes, I am.

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5 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY IN THIS

6 **PROCEEDING?**

7 A. The purpose of my testimony is to respond to the direct testimony filed by 8 certain witnesses for CMC Steel South Carolina ("CMC Steel"), the South 9 Carolina Energy Users Committee ("SCEUC"), the South Carolina Coastal 10 Conservation League ("SCCCL") and the South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff ("ORS"). In general, I respond to CMC Steel Witness Dennis W. Goins' 11 12 testimony addressing the amortization period for costs associated with DSM 13 programs, recommending a limited recovery period for lost net margin revenue, and opposing the proposed ROE incentive. With respect to SCEUC Witness 14 Kevin W. O'Donnell, I address his recommendations with respect to the proposed 15 ROE incentive. I also respond to the testimony of SCCCL Witnesses William 16

Steinhurst and Thomas Lyle regarding the allocation of DSM program costs, expenses for corporate image advertising, lost net margin revenue, a monitoring, verification and evaluation process, the establishment of goals for DSM programs and a negative ROE adjustment. Finally, I address ORS Witness Randy Gunn's testimony regarding the proposed program year and determination of the Company's lost net margin revenue.

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Q. WITH RESPECT TO THE TESTIMONY OF DR. GOINS, PLEASE ADDRESS HIS RECOMMENDATION THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD APPROVE A TEN-YEAR AMORTIZATION PERIOD.

Beginning on page 15 of his testimony, Dr. Goins recommends that the Commission should approve a ten-year amortization period over which SCE&G should be allowed to recover its costs of implementing the DSM programs instead of the five-year period as proposed by the Company. Although the annual costs borne by the customer would initially be lower due to the longer amortization period, an extended ten-year period would ultimately result in additional costs to the customer. South Carolina law and Commission precedent permit electric utilities to recover the carrying costs of the amortized amount of their DSM program investments. If the Company is required to recover its incurred costs over a longer period of time, the total amount of carrying costs passed through to the customer will be substantially more. Investors perceive regulatory assets to have higher risks than investments in physical assets that are serving customers on

an on-going basis. In sum, the Company believes that its five-year amortization period balances timely recovery of its costs over a reasonable period of time and reduces the ultimate cost of the program to the customer. Moreover, as stated in my direct testimony, a five-year period for calculating the amortization of DSM costs was previously approved by the Commission for the Company in Order No. 96-15, in Docket No. 95-1000-E.

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HOW DOES SCE&G RESPOND TO DR. GOINS' SUGGESTION ON PAGE 7 OF HIS TESTIMONY THAT THE COMMISSION SHOULD LIMIT THE RECOVERY PERIOD FOR LOST NET MARGIN REVENUE TO THE SHORTER OF THREE YEARS OR UNTIL SCE&G'S BASE RATES ARE ADJUSTED IN A GENERAL RATE CASE?

SCE&G believes that this proposal would substantially increase the Company's risks in providing DSM programs and would not comply with the requirements of Section 58-37-20. Effective DSM programs will result in lost revenue due to reduced sales until rates are adjusted in a subsequent rate proceeding. If a rate proceeding is not filed every three years, then the Company's net revenue will be reduced by the amount of revenue lost to DSM investments made three years or more earlier. Precluding the Company from recovering these lost net margin revenues would be contrary to the express language of Section 58-37-20 which requires the Commission to establish rates and charges that ensure that the Company's net income after implementation of its DSM programs is at

least as high as the net income would have been if the programs had not been implemented.

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Q. DR. GOINS SUGGESTS THAT SCE&G'S PROPOSED ROE INCENTIVE IS DESIGNED FOR THE BENEFIT OF ITS SHAREHOLDERS AT THE EXPENSE OF CUSTOMERS. DOES THE COMPANY AGREE WITH THIS STATEMENT?

No, it does not. SCE&G's goal in this process is to implement DSM programs that are designed to be effective in reducing energy demand and consumption on its system. The core concern of the Company in selecting these programs is that they pass the Total Resource Cost test, which is discussed more fully by Company Witness Pickles in his direct testimony. In order to accomplish this goal, the Company is only seeking to recover the costs of the programs and lost net margin revenue along with a modest incentive. This incentive is reasonable and fairly balances the interest of customers in energy savings and the interest of the Company in meeting the reasonable expectations of investors in light of increased risks from DSM investments.

1	Q.	MR.	O'DON	NELL	ALSO	SUGGESTS	THAT	THE	PROPOSE	Z D
2		INCE	NTIVE	SHOU	LD BE	LOWER	BECAUSI	E A	FIVE-YEA	R
3		AMO	RTIZAT	ION PE	RIOD A	S RECOMM	ENDED B	Y THE	COMPAN	ΙY
4		WOU	LD RED	UCE ITS	S RISKS.	DO YOU AO	GREE?			

No, I do not agree. SCE&G will still be subjected to additional risk by implementing DSM programs rather than building additional generation facilities. Generally, when a utility makes a prudent investment in a physical asset, the investor has a reasonable assurance that the Company will be allowed the opportunity to earn a return on that investment over the asset's useful life. By contrast, a DSM investment results only in the creation of a new entry in SCE&G's accounting records in the form of a regulatory asset. Investors consider such assets inherently more risky than investments in physical facilities that are serving customers over extended periods of time.

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15 Q. PLEASE ADDRESS DR. STEINHURST'S SUGGESTION THAT THE 16 COMPANY'S PROPOSED ALLOCATION METHOD 17 INAPPROPRIATELY ALLOCATES DSM COSTS AMONG CUSTOMER 18 CLASSES.

On page 19 of his testimony, Dr. Steinhurst suggests that DSM delivers system-wide benefits that are enjoyed by all customers in proportion to their power use and that class cost allocation should be conducted in a similar manner to that used for other resources acquired to serve load. While SCE&G agrees that

DSM programs deliver system-wide benefits, the Commission has previously recognized the reasonableness of directly assigning operating costs to the customer class causing the costs when identifiable on the books and records of the Company. Hence, the responsibility for costs should be assigned to the customer classes that cause the cost when and where possible. Compared to Dr. Steinhurst's suggestion, direct assignment results in a more precise match of DSM cost by customer class with the rate benefits received by customer class. The Commission has approved this methodology of direct assignment in previous cost of service studies submitted to the Commission by SCE&G. Therefore, the Company believes that the use in this proceeding of direct assignment of cost to the appropriate customer class is fully consistent with the practices authorized by the Commission.

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PLEASE COMMENT ON DR. STEINHURST'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THE COMMISSION DISALLOW RECOVERY OF EXPENSES FOR CORPORATE IMAGE ADVERTISING.

I would simply respond that the Company has not proposed the inclusion of any corporate advertising expenses in this proceeding and does not intend to do so in the future.

Q. DR. STEINHURST ALSO STATES ON PAGE 21 OF HIS TESTIMONY THAT THE COMPANY'S DETERMINATION OF MARGIN REVENUE OVERSTATES THE MAGNITUDE OF LOST REVENUE TO THE COMPANY DUE TO DSM SAVINGS. DO YOU AGREE?

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No, I do not agree. Dr. Steinhurst suggests that the Company's calculation of net margin revenue omits any correction for off-system sales, sales for resale, reduced purchases of energy and capacity or transmission by others or other reduced expenses. However, when SCE&G performs a cost of service study, the Company includes these sources of revenue as an off-set to the revenue requirement on which retail rates are set. Thus, the Company's current rates, which are the basis of the lost revenue calculation, reflect a credit for these sales and as a result, the revenues from off-system sales and the other benefits mentioned above are embedded in the lost revenue calculation. It also should be noted these sales are highly variable and uncertain and there is no reliable basis for projecting increased levels of future sales in SCE&G's calculation of net margin revenue in the current DSM filing. Therefore, the net margin revenue proposed by Company in this proceeding appropriately reflects the reductions recommended by Dr. Steinhurst.

Q. HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO DR. STEINHURST'S SUGGESTION, ON PAGE 22 OF HIS TESTIMONY, THAT THE COMPANY'S LOST NET MARGIN REVENUE RECOVERY MECHANISM DOES NOT INCLUDE ADEQUATE MEASUREMENT AND VERIFICATION OF DSM SAVINGS?

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I disagree. SCE&G's cost recovery plan relies on the savings impacts specified in the South Carolina Measures Library Database ("Measures Database"). SCE&G partnered with Duke Energy, Progress Energy and Santee Cooper to have this database created by experts in the field specifically for South Carolina for the purpose of having professional, independent savings estimates to support the annual cost recovery process. SCE&G believes that the use of the Measures Database will effectively accomplish the objective of monitoring, verifying and evaluating DSM savings. Moreover, the Company intends to update and validate the DSM savings information in this database as part of its ongoing monitoring and verification initiatives. In summary, SCE&G believes that relying on estimates from the Measures Database is reasonable and appropriate for implementation of its portfolio of DSM programs as well as reasonable and appropriate for use in the annual cost recovery and auditing process.

1	Q.	HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THE SUGGESTION THAT THE
2		COMMISSION SHOULD SET GOALS FOR DSM PROGRAMS AT THIS
3		TIME?
4	A.	I agree with the logic presented in Order No. 2009-373, p. 20-21:

Even then, as testified to by [Progress Energy Witness] Bateman, the results of a market potential study alone are not adequate to create valid goals, and additional factors must be known before target goals can be established with any level of precision. For example, the utility must gain experience with the DSM/EE program implementation process and determine customer acceptance rates. Bateman explained that if appropriate, the issue of performance targets can be revisited in future

DSM/EE cost-recovery proceedings after these critical factors are known....

I believe the finding of the Commission in Order No. 2009-373 is clear and unequivocal. It is not possible to establish performance goals with any level of precision at this time. If necessary and appropriate, goals can be considered in a future proceeding.

Q. HOW DOES THE COMPANY RESPOND TO DR. STEINHURST'S RECOMMENDATION THAT SCE&G BE SUBJECTED TO A NEGATIVE ROE ADJUSTMENT IF ITS PROGRAMS DO NOT ACHIEVE CERTAIN GOALS?

A. Dr. Steinhurst suggests that SCE&G be punished for not meeting preestablished goals by having its ROE on DSM investment reduced below the level the Commission has determined to be reasonable and compensatory. SCE&G

believes that Dr. Steinhurst's suggestion of a punitive ROE adjustment is unreasonable and inappropriate. Further, this recommendation is contrary to the statutory requirements of Section 58-37-20. Dr. Steinhurst acknowledges that the statute requires incentives for energy suppliers to invest in DSM programs and that an ROE adder can be an effective incentive mechanism. Yet, Dr. Steinhurst proposes to penalize the Company if customers do not participate in DSM programs, despite SCE&G's willingness to advance energy savings initiatives. Furthermore, notwithstanding SCE&G's commitment to cost-effective energy efficiency programs and to ensure that customers are aware of these opportunities, the customer must decide whether or not he or she will take advantage of the Company's offerings. Consequently, the relationship between incentives provided through DSM programs and actual savings achieved is often beyond the Company's control, as customers determine their participation in DSM programs and their energy usage. The ultimate level of energy savings which may be realized from these programs is, therefore, unknown at this time. Thus, establishing an ROE penalty for failing to meet goals which cannot reasonably be ascertained at this time would be unreasonable, unfair and contrary to the statutory requirements that DSM investment be treated in a way that is at least as attractive as investment in generation assets.

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Q. ON PAGE 5 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. GUNN SUGGESTS THAT THE PROPOSED PROGRAM YEAR SHOULD CONFORM TO A CALENDAR OR FISCAL YEAR AS OPPOSED TO CONCLUDING IN NOVEMBER OF EACH YEAR. PLEASE DISCUSS THIS RECOMMENDATION.

The Company believes concluding the reporting period in November of each year is preferable because it provides the public, the Commission and ORS sufficient time to review the Company's annual filing. Going forward, the Company proposes adjusting the rate rider with the first billing cycle of May of each year. The intent behind this annual implementation date is to correspond to the Company's annual fuel filing, such that the annual adjustment to the fuel factor and the DSM rate rider will become effective in the same billing cycle. The Company believes a shared effective date is preferable in that it will reduce customer confusion by minimizing the number of adjustments implemented each year. In order to provide at least three months after filing to allow for public comment and for the Commission's and ORS's review, the Company, therefore, proposes to make its annual filing in January of each year. Due to the time required for proper accounting, a January filing date is not practicable without closing the review period on November 30th of each year. We continue to believe that this timeline and, therefore, the proposed fiscal year of December 1 to November 30 is the best fiscal period for the Company's accounting and reporting on its DSM program.

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1	Q.	ON PAGE 17 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. GUNN EXPRESSED CONCERN
2		ABOUT THE COMPANY'S DETERMINATION OF ITS LOST MARGIN
3		DOES THE COMPANY'S LOST MARGIN DETERMINATION ADJUST
4		FOR VARIABLE O&M COSTS AS RECOMMENDED BY MR. GUNN?

Yes it does. As Mr. Gunn states, lost margin revenue is equal to lost revenue, less fuel costs and less variable O&M costs. In my Exhibit KRJ-1 attached to my direct testimony, references to adjusting for fuel costs include an adjustment to deduct variable O&M costs such as sulfur-dioxide ("SO₂") allowances, nitrogen-oxide ("NOx") allowances, lime, limestone and ammonia. Likewise, the Company has deducted all environmental costs from electric revenue in the same manner as they are deducted from fuel costs. Therefore, by adjusting for the Company's fuel costs in the lost margin revenue calculation, variable O&M costs have been similarly deducted.

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Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

16 A. Yes.